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Abstract
Policies aimed at promoting regional development have often had
disappointing results. The present paper oﬀers an explanation for why
such policies may fail, and, more importantly, analyses how policies
may be designed to create regional growth. Our main argument is
that broad based policies should be chosen in regions with weak in-
stitutions. In regions with stronger institutions, policies targeted at
promoting investment in specific firms or industries may be more eﬃ-
cient. The basis for this policy recommendation is the hypothesis that
in countries with weak institutions, targeted policies create rents that
attract rent seekers. Broad based policies, on the other hand, create a
balanced process of industrialization, which reduces the scope for rent
seeking.
1 Introduction
Regional development policy is intended to help the economy overcome struc-
tural economic diﬃculties and thereby promote economic growth. The re-
source injection is intended to be only temporary since the final goal is a
self-sustainable growth process rather than a permanent transfer from rich
to poor regions. An eﬃcient policy should therefore be able to push the
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economy out of a ‘bad’ equilibrium, characterised by an under-utilization of
the productive capacity, at the lowest cost.
Empirical evidence shows that policies aimed at promoting economic de-
velopment in poor regions often have failed to produce the desired results,
particularly when the institutional environment in the recipient regions is
weak. Burnside and Dollar (2000) show that foreign aid to low income coun-
tries has a positive impact only if the recipient country has sound policies,
measured by low inflation, low budget deficits, and low barriers to trade.
Similarly, Boldrin and Canova (2001) and Midelfart and Overman (2002)
argue that regional policy in the European Union has had a very limited
eﬀect in fostering economic growth and attracting economic activity and em-
ployment. Cappelen et al (2003) and Ederveen et al (2003) demonstrate that
regional support in Europe has been more eﬀective in speeding up the process
of convergence in countries with more developed economies and institutions.
Our analysis oﬀers an explanation to why development policies in regions
with poorly developed institutions may fail. More importantly, we show how
regional policies should be designed so as to promote industrialization in dif-
ferent institutional environments. Conceptually, we organize economic policy
into two categories, broad based and targeted policies. Broad based policies
apply to all, or at least most, relevant sectors of the economy, and promote
investment in general. Such policies could include public investments in in-
frastructure and education. Alternatively, a broad based policy could be in
the form of subsidized credit where all investment projects that fulfill some
easily observable and verifiable standards qualify for the subsidy.
Targeted policies, on the other hand, involve a greater measure of discre-
tion on the part of policy makers. By oﬀering incentives to specific investors,
the aim of targeted policy is to ‘pick winners’. The targeted firms are ex-
pected to develop into ‘growth poles’, generating spillovers to the rest of the
economy. Over time, aided by these spillovers, the economy will move out of
the bad equilibrium. A targeted policy may thus be an eﬃcient way to start
a growth process, since such a policy involves only a limited intervention and
then relies on spillover eﬀects from this intervention to do the rest of the job.
Our basic argument is that targeted policies in a weaker institutional en-
vironment are likely to associated with clientelism and rent seeking, which
reduce the eﬃciency of these types of policies. Analysing the situation in
Russia, Frye (2002) demonstrates that the relationship between firms favored
with various types of privileges and policy makers oﬀering these privileges
is a fairly balanced one. The support to certain firms is given as a quid
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pro quo, where the privileged firms have to accept a stronger degree of state
intervention in the running of the firm. Robinson and Verdier (2003) show
that policy makers often intervene by oﬀering well paid jobs, typically in the
public sector, as a way to create political support. The authors argue that
this is costly, but credible way to create clientelistic relationships. Alesina,
Danninger, and Rostagno (1999) analyse public sector employment as a re-
distributive devise in the case of Italy.
Employment that primarily has a political purpose, can reasonably be
expected to be economically low productive. Commenting on formal sector
overemployment in less developed countries, Lewis (1954, page 142) notes
that: “Most businesses in underdeveloped countries employ a large number
of ‘messengers’, whose contribution is almost negligible; you see them sitting
outside oﬃce doors, or hanging around in the courtyard.”
In regions with weak institutions, targeted policies will be used for polit-
ical purposes. An external donor, or the autonomous leadership in a country
plagued by bureaucratic corruption and regulatory capture, would in such an
environment be well advised to choose broad based policies in order to stim-
ulate economic growth. Since such policies do not open up for discrimination
between firms, there is no room for quid pro quo relationships between firms
and policy makers. When policy makers have no special privileges to oﬀer,
firms will refrain from oﬀering patronage employment, and employment de-
cisions will be made on a profit maximizing basis. Low-productive patronage
employment can in such an environment be expected to be less prevalent.
The analytical framework we use to analyse the eﬃciency of regional de-
velopment policies is based on the dual technology, limit pricing model of
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989). This model demonstrates that coun-
tries or regions can be caught in a low-equilibrium trap, with only relatively
ineﬃcient, constant returns to scale technology in use. The role of devel-
opment policy is to promote a suﬃcient amount of investment in modern,
increasing returns to scale technology, to push the economy away from the
poverty trap, and on the path to the high income, fully industrialized equilib-
rium, characterized by large scale production in all sectors. Our paper adds
to the Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny model of industrialization by introducing
rent seeking and by analysing the eﬃciency of alternative policy measures in
lifting the economy out of the poverty trap.
The dual technology, limit pricing model diﬀers from the standard ana-
lytical tool used in studying regional economics, namely monopolistic com-
petition. In the dual technology model, the monopoly power of the large
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scale firms is limited by the potential entry of small scale producers, capa-
ble of producing the same good as the large scale producer. This should
be contrasted with the market structure in monopolistic competition, where
monopoly power is limited by competition from firms using identical technol-
ogy to produce diﬀerentiated products. While both models share common
features, one could argue that the dual technology model is relatively more
appealing in a less developed economy context, where small scale production
is a relatively more important feature of the economy.
New economic geography models, such as Dupont and Martin (2003),
Forslid (2004), Midelfart (2004), analyse the location of activity, i.e., the
question of where people and firms are. These models may generate core-
periphery outcomes, and the policy issue is how to attract firms to the periph-
eral region. Since concentration of economic activity is generally the more
eﬃcient solution for the economy as a whole, policies that aim at a greater
dispersion of industrial production must trade oﬀ distributional gains against
eﬃciency losses.
In contrast, we focus on a single region, and analyse not where people
are, but what they do. The ambition of economic policy is to mobilize local
resources to more productive use, from the traditional sector to the more
eﬃcient modern sector. On the road to industrialization, however, there is a
danger that resources will be caught up in a completely unproductive activity,
namely rent seeking. In this sense, people in our model may be involved in
zero productive, low productive, or highly productive activities. Note also
that in the present analysis, the regional policy may create eﬃciency gains.
Our paper is related to Baland and Francois (2000) and Torvik (2002). In
both of these contributions a dual technology, limit pricing model is used to
analyse the eﬀect of an external resource inflow on a rent seeking economy.
Focusing on rents from natural resources, their main observation is that the
inflow of resources leads to increased rent seeking, which drains productive
entrepreneurship. Due to economies of scale in the productive sector, the
external inflow of resources may actually lead to a lower income for the
economy as a whole. While the present analysis is based on the same model
of imperfect competition, our paper diﬀers from both of these papers by
analysing how an inflow of resources, in the form of regional aid, should be
designed in order to promote growth in a rent seeking economy.
The paper is organised as follows. We start out by describing the basic
model without rent seeking. Section 3 introduces rent seeking. Section 4
analyses the choice between broad based and targeted policy in a rent seeking
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economy. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Consider an economy consisting of two sectors, each producing a good xi.
The goods can be produced by means of two technologies, traditional and
modern, using labor as the only input. Total labor supply L in the region
is given, and normalized to unity. The traditional technology is constant
returns to scale, with one unit of labour producing 1/α units of output.
We choose the wage rate in the traditional sector as numeraire, so that the
marginal cost of traditional production is α. There is perfect competition
between the traditional producers, and hence α is also the supply price.
Modern technology is increasing returns to scale. indicated by superscript
irs, and described by the following labor input requirement:
lirsi = f + αβx
irs
i . (1)
Here, f is a fixed cost and β < 1 is an inverse measure of the productivity
markup in modern production relative to traditional production.
Consumption choice is based on a Cobb-Doublas utility function with
equal budget shares. When in operation, the profit maximizing strategy of a
modern firm is limit pricing, choosing a price (marginally below) traditional
producers’ supply price α. In this way, a modern firm captures the entire
market for its product. Its monopoly power is, however, limited by the
potential entry of small scale producers.
The wage rate in modern sector production is fixed, and given by w > 1.
Using data from Ghana, Teal (1996) finds that the wage gap between formal
and informal sector employment is significant, and that trade unions, firm
size, foreign and state ownership, and firm level profits positively aﬀect the
wage gap. Profits for firm i are given by:
πi = αxirsi − wlirsi . (2)
We can think of the wage markup relative to traditional sector, w − 1,
as determined by trade unions active in the formal sector, or to a politically
determined minimum wage, being eﬀective only in the modern sector.
The role for regional policy in the present analysis is to solve a coordina-
tion failure. In a traditional economy, each potential entrepreneur will not
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find it profitable to invest in modern technology, but if many (both) sectors
industrialized in a coordinated move, each investment would be profitable.
Assume that a potential entrepreneur who considers investing in modern
technology takes into account the eﬀect of the investment on income in the
economy, which in turn aﬀects the profitability of the investment. However,
she takes the status of the remaining sector of the economy as given, and
hence does not internalize any response by other firms to her investment
decision. If an investment takes place in sector i while sector j is traditional,
regional income is given by:
Y MT = 1 + (w − 1) lirsi + πi. (3)
Profits, as perceived by the investor in sector i, are therefore given by:
πMTi =
Y MT
2
− wlirsi . (4)
With modern production in sector i and traditional in j, equilibrium in
labor and goods markets imply that:
xcrsj = x
irs
i ⇒
lcrsj
α
=
lirsi − f
αβ
, for xcrsj > 0. (5)
Using (5) and the fact that L = 1 = lcrsj + l
irs
i , the optimal number of
workers in the modern sector is given by:
lirsi =
β + f
β + 1
, for xcrsj > 0. (6)
Using (6) in (1), we can express the output of a modern firm in this partly
industrialized economy as:
xirsi =
1− f
(β + 1)α
, for xcrsj > 0. (7)
Using (6) and (7) in (4), we can express the profits perceived by a potential
investor in sector i as:
πMTi =
1− f − w (β + f)
β + 1
. (8)
From (8) we see that:
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πMTi < 0⇒ f >
1− wβ
w + 1
. (9)
When the inequality in (9) holds, a potential investor will not find it
profitable to adopt a modern technology. Under these circumstances, both
sectors will continue to produce by means of traditional technology, and
income in the economy, Y TT is equal to one.1
The non-profitability condition, as expressed by (9), is a necessary but
not suﬃcient condition for the existence of coordination failure. We also
need to derive the condition for when a coordinated investment is indeed
profitable. When both sectors have modernized, regional income is given by
Y MM = w + 2πi. (10)
When both sectors have modernized, lirsi = l
irs
j = 0.5, and the equilibrium
condition in the goods and labor market is given by the following equation:
xirsi = x
irs
j =
0.5− f
αβ
. (11)
Using (11) and lirsi = l
irs
j = 0.5 in (2), profits in a fully industrialized
economy can be expressed as:
πMMi =
1− 2f − wβ
2β
. (12)
A coordinated investment is profitable if:
πMMi > 0⇒ f <
1− wβ
2
. (13)
The condition for multiple equilibria to exist in the present model is
therefore given by:
πMTi < 0 < π
MM
i ⇔
1− wβ
w + 1
< f <
1− wβ
2
. (14)
Hence, coordination failure applies if the fixed costs take on an intermedi-
ate value, such that it is unprofitable for a single firm to invest but profitable
1Note that a change in α does not aﬀect Y TT . The reason is that the change in quantity
is perfectly cancelled out by a change in price in the opposite direction. Hence, while a
change in α aﬀects real output, in nominal terms, income stays the same.
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for the two firms to invest in tandem. We assume that the inequalities in
(14) apply, implying that the regional economy, characterized by traditional
production, is caught in a low-income trap. Our aim is to analyse policies
that may lead the country out of the traditional technology equilibrium, and
to a fully modernized economy. One way to implement the coordinated in-
vestment is to oﬀer subsidies such that one firm invests. Given investment by
one firm, the condition πMMi > 0 implies that the second firm will also find it
profitable to invest, even without a subsidy. In what now follows, we analyse
the eﬃciency of diﬀerent policies in moving the economy the industrialized
equilibrium.
We distinguish between broad based policies that oﬀer investment incen-
tives to both firms in a non-discriminatory way, and targeted policies where
the policy maker picks a ‘winner’, and relies on the spillover eﬀects from this
investment to create an incentive also for the non-favored firm to invest.2
For concreteness, we model economic policy as an investment subsidy,
s. The policy could be in the form of subsidized credit, or more indirect
measures that increase the profitability of investment, such as investments
in education and infrastructure. The targeted policy reduces the fixed in-
vestment cost to the selected firm, whereas the broad based policy oﬀers the
same incentive to both firms.
Subtracting s from f in (8), the level of s such that a single investor
exactly breaks even, i.e., such that πMTi = 0, can be found as:
s∗ =
f + w (β + f)− 1
1 + w
. (15)
When s ≥ s∗ has been oﬀered to one firm, this firm will invest. Once this
investment has been successfully carried out, the other firm will also find it
profitable to invest (since πMMi > 0). By making use of the demand linkages
created by the investment, the policy maker only has to oﬀer s∗ to a single
firm in order to stimulate a move to the industrialized equilibrium. The
alternative would be a broad based policy oﬀering s∗ to both firms, which
clearly involves twice the amount of investment subsidies compared to the
targeted policy.
In a weak institutional environment, however, targeted policies open up
for rent seeking and patronage employment in a quid pro quo exchange be-
2In our model the optimal policy might require asymmetric incentives even if sectors
are identical. For an interesting discussion on optimal incentives with identical agents, see
Winter (2004).
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tween firms and policy makers. Our fundamental assumption is that broad
based policies are not exposed to this kind of interaction between firms and
policy makers, since broad based policies do not discriminate between firms.
We first formalize rent seeking, and then turn to the optimal choice of policy.
3 Rent seeking
Rent seeking may take place at two levels in our model. First, by firms
lobbying policy makers for the targeted investment subsidy, and second, by
workers lobbying policy makers for well paid, modern sector employment.
3.1 Rent seeking by firms
Firms compete for targeted subsidies by oﬀering to establish patronage po-
sitions, i.e., jobs that the policy maker can allocated to people of his own
choice. People employed for political reasons can reasonably be expected
to be less productive than those employed for their skills. We simplify by
assuming that patronage labor is completely unproductive.
Let lgi be the number of patronage positions oﬀered by firm i and l
g
j by
firm j. The probability of firm i receiving the subsidy is given by:
ρi =
lgi
lgi + l
g
j
. (16)
Hence, the more patronage positions that a firm oﬀers relative to its
competitor, the larger is the likelihood that this firm will receive the transfer.
We assume that the responsiveness of the government to lobbying, in their
decision on which firm to favor with the investment subsidy, depends on the
institutional quality of the region, given by θ. The higher is θ the lower is
the institutional quality.
There are certain transaction costs for firms associated with lobbying.
These costs include such factors as time spent formulating an oﬀer of pa-
tronage employment, and time spent ‘selling’ this oﬀer to the policy maker.
We model these costs simply as a fixed cost g. The expected benefit of a firm
i from lobbying for subsidies is therefore given by:
vi = ρiθs− wlgi − g (17)
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where the first term is expected gain from lobbying, with θs being the
size of the rent, the second term is the cost in terms of patronage positions
and the last term represents the fixed lobbying costs. Maximizing (17) with
respect to lgi , we get the first order condition:
∂vi
∂lgi
=
θslgi¡
lgi + l
g
j
¢2 − w = 0 (18)
Using (18) in (16), and the fact that in a symmetric equilibrium lgi = l
g
j =
lg and therefore ρi = ρj = 0.5, we get:
lg =
θs
4w
. (19)
We see from (19) that the number of patronage positions in equilibrium
increases in the size of the rent θs and decreases in the modern sector wage.
3.2 Rent seeking by workers
Workers in the traditional sector are aware of the possibility of getting well-
paid jobs in the formal sector by oﬀering loyalty, votes or bribes to policy
makers, possibly via some pressure groups that act as intermediaries (like the
mafia). The workers have to compete for the attention of the policy makers
or pressure groups, and this takes time. The resources devoted to lobbying,
which we shall also refer to as rent seeking, is given by lrs. In equilibrium,
the level of rent seeking can be found from the condition:
1 =
wlg
lrs + lg
. (20)
The left hand side of (20) is the marginal cost of lobbying, given by
the wage in the traditional sector. The right hand side gives the marginal
income, in expected terms, from lobbying. Here, the probability of getting a
patronage position is given by the number of jobs open to rent seeking, lg,
divided by the number of people looking for these jobs, lrs+ lg. Hence, lrs is
the number of people that have failed in their attempt to obtain patronage
employment. The time spent lobbying yields zero income.3 Rearranging
(20), we get:
lrs = (w − 1) lg. (21)
3This formulation of rent seeking is similar to that guiding urban migration in the well
known Harris-Todaro model.
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In a rent seeking economy, labor input in a modern firm as the single
investor in the region is given by:
lˆirsi = f + αβxˆ
irs
i + l
g, for xcrsj > 0, (22)
where xˆirsi is the firm’s output, to be derived below. Clearly, for l
g = 0,
(22) reduces to (1). The product market equilibrium in this case is charac-
terized by:
xcrsj = xˆ
irs
i ⇒
lcrsj
α
=
lˆirsi − lg − f
αβ
, for xcrsj > 0, (23)
which reduces to (5) for lg = 0. With rent seeking, the resource constraint
in a partially industrialized economy is given by L = 1 = lcrsj + lˆ
irs
i + l
rs +
2g. The last term, 2g, refers to the transaction costs associated with the
two entrepreneurs’ lobbying for the targeted investment subsidy. Using this
information, (22) and (23), we find that:
lˆirsi =
β + f
β + 1
+
(1− wβ + β) θs− 8gβw
4w (1 + β)
, for xcrsj > 0. (24)
The second term in (24) represents the distortion in formal sector em-
ployment due to rent seeking. This can be seen by noting that in a perfect
institutional environment, θ = 0 and g = 0, so that (24) reduces to (6).
Whether rent seeking leads to more or less modern sector employment in
a partially industrialized equilibrium, depends on two components. On the
one hand, the presence of patronage jobs expands occupation in the modern
sector. An increase in the amount of the subsidy (s) and in the likelihood of
being able to obtain it, as measured by the institutional quality (θ), increases
the expected benefits from lobbying and in turn increases the level of patron-
age employment. On the other hand, rent seeking ties up real resources, with
zero productive workers in patronage positions, unsuccessful rent seekers who
are left unemployed, and resources wasted in the fixed transaction costs (g).
This resource waste reduces income and therefore demand and supply in the
economy. The balance between these two contrasting eﬀects determines the
sign of the second term in (24), and therefore whether rent seeking expands
or contracts modern sector employment.
Using (22), we can express the equilibrium quantity of goods to be sup-
plied by the modern firm as:
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xˆirsi =
1− f
(β + 1)α
− 8g + θs
4 (β + 1)α
, for xcrsj > 0. (25)
The second term in (25) captures the distortion in modern firm supply
due to rent seeking. Clearly, for g, θ, s > 0 this term is negative. In a perfect
institutional environment, g = θ = 0, and (25) reduces to (7). Profits in a
rent seeking economy can be expressed as:
πˆMTi =
1− lˆirsi − 2g − lrs + wlˆirsi + πˆMTi
2
− wblirsi − g, (26)
where the numerator of the first term on the right hand side is Yˆ MT .
Subtracting s from the fixed investment cost, and using (21), (24), and (25),
we can express profits as a function of (amongst other things) institutional
quality θ, the investment subsidy s, and the fixed lobbying cost g, as:
πˆMTi =
4 + 8g (wβ − 2− β)− 4 (w + 1) (f − s)− 2sθ − 4wβ − sθβ (1− w)
4 (1 + β)
(27)
We now turn to the issue of optimal policy choice, in an imperfect insti-
tutional environment characterized by rent seeking.
4 Broad based versus targeted policies
The minimum level of a targeted investment subsidy required for the favored
firm to break even can be found from the condition πˆMTi = 0, resulting in:
sˆ∗ =
4 (f + fw + wβ + 2g (β − wβ + 2)− 1)
4w − 2θ − θβ + wθβ + 4 . (28)
Figure 1 illustrates the choice between broad based policies, oﬀering s∗
to each firm, and the targeted policy sˆ∗.4
Clearly, for θ < θ∗, the targeted policy is less costly than the broad
based policy. Here, the institutional quality is suﬃciently developed to allow
targeted polices to be implemented without attracting too much rent seeking.
On the other hand, for θ > θ∗, the institutional quality is relatively poor,
4The numerical values upon which the figure is based are: f = 0.3,β = 0.3, w = 1.3, g =
0.0017.
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θθ∗0
 s^* < 2s*  s^* > 2s*
 s^* 
 2s*
Figure 1: Broad based versus targeted policy
and the rent seeking costs of targeted policies suﬃciently important to make
broad based policies the less costly choice.
The critical level of institutional quality at which the targeted and broad
based policy create investment at equal cost, can be found as:
θ∗ =
2 (1− f) + 2w (1− β + 4g − 2f) + 4g (2 + β)− w2 (2f + 2β + 4gβ)
β (1− f)− 2f (1 + w)− 3wβ − wβ2 + w2β (f + β) + 2
.
(29)
It can be shown that θ∗ increases in β, f , and w, and falls in g. Indeed, if
β, f , or w are suﬃciently small, and/or g is suﬃciently large, the broad based
policy is preferable for all θ ∈ (0, 1). Similarly, if β, f , or w are suﬃciently
large, and/or g is suﬃciently small, the targeted policy is preferable for all
θ ∈ (0, 1).
Intuitively, the higher are β, f , or w, the more costly it is to establish
profitable large-scale production. This is an argument in favor of a targeted
policy. A higher level of g increases the cost of the targeted policy, by in-
creasing the transaction costs associated with lobbying for the investment
subsidy.
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5 Conclusion
Regional policies aimed at creating economic development through industri-
alization have often failed to meet expectations. In particular in regions with
poor political and economic institutions, these policies seem to have had only
negligible eﬀects on economic growth. Our analysis has attempted to shed
light on this observation, by emphasising the eﬀect of rent seeking on the
optimal policy choice.
We demonstrate that in a situation with poor institutions, oﬀering tar-
geted investment incentives may create rent seeking, which crowds out some
of the eﬀect of the policy. In this way, creating industrialization by means
of targeted policies in regions with less developed institutions may be very
costly. Indeed, if the policy maker or donor does not internalize the crowding
out eﬀect of rent seeking, the investment incentives are likely to be too small,
and therefore fail in moving the economy to a higher income equilibrium.
If the institutional quality is suﬃciently poor, broad based policies are
likely to be less costly in terms of generating industrialization. Since broad
based policies do not involve discrimination between firms, these policies are
less likely to be ‘captured’ by special interest groups.
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